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 “Are you experienced?” The use of experiential knowledge in mental health 
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I want to thank Lydia and Harry for their invitation to present here today. When 
I wrote the talk I had my experiences here last year very much at the forefront of 
my mind. In particular, two aspects of my trip last year stuck out. The first was 
my own position- I was here both as a mental health clinician/academic and a 
survivor of sexual abuse and therefore in some sense an ‘expert by experience’. 
The second was something fellow delegates said towards the end of the 
conference. “What do we do now that we have talked about all these painful 
experiences that have happened to us?” “How do we leave here and go home 
with all these painful experiences aired but not resolved?” I thought this was a 
most profound and unsettling question. What are we doing when we bring our 
experience to a conference like this? What is our experience for here? What does 
experience mean? 
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The first thing I thought was it is not a therapeutic rendering of our experience 
for individual healing, or if we think it is this is understandable but we are liable 
to be disappointed. In my own psychological therapy I brought my ‘experiences’ 
of abuse and resultant trauma in order to first have them witnessed, then 
processed and then integrated. Of course, that is not what I thought was 
happening at the time. I went along desperate for help with a mess of experience 
that I did not understand or even see clearly.  
 
So if the primary purpose of us discussing our ‘experience’ at a place like this is 
not psychologically therapeutic then is it communally therapeutic? By coming 
together in our varied roles can we find some common thread of humanity that 
can send us home feeling less alone? I think this is absolutely the case and I find 
working together with survivors of differing ‘experiences’ to be the most healing 
and gratifying aspects of my work as a survivor.  
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However, this again is not simple as any reading of the very real splits in mental 
health user movements will see that experiences are not shared across; as Jijian 
Veronka says in her skillful essay on the complexities of being a ‘person with 
lived experience’; “Universalizing ourselves as ‘experts by experience’ belies the 
variances that our bodies carry, how we experience madness, and how mental 
health fields of power respond to us.” So some people with ‘lived experience’ 
appreciate the validation and certainty of a diagnostic label, while others 
experience this categorization as a form of violence. Now the reasons for this are 
complex and as I argued in my talk last year may be as much down to the 
relational and ethical context in which the diagnosis occurs as anything else. 
Nonetheless we can see situations whereby people’s ‘lived experience’ can be 
invalidated by the contradictory ‘lived experience’ of another person. Given the 
emotional labour it takes to describe aspects of our ‘experience’ this invalidation 
is likely to be personally costly for many of us, it certainly has been for me.  
 
So, given that there may be some risks entailed in acting as a ‘person with lived 
experience’, and given in a context like this one we might be unsure what this 
role allows us to do or to be. And given that it is highly likely that in having an 
homogenous term like ‘person with lived experience’ or ‘expert by experience’ to 
describe many of us we may actually mean very different things from one 
another, it seems useful to ask some questions about ‘experience’ in this context. 
 
The development of what Professor of Citizen Participation Peter Beresford 
refers to as ‘experiential knowledge’ has come from the struggle of mental health 
service users over many decades to be recognized as having legitimate 
knowledge about the psychiatric system. More recently this struggle for both 
epistemic recognition and a demand for experiential knowledge to inform 
mental health research, policy and practice has been described under the 
umbrella term Mad Studies.  
 
This struggle, that draws on civil rights movements both in terms of activist 
strategies and intellectual underpinning, has been in the face of a psychiatric 
orthodoxy that has viewed mental patients as lacking rationality. The 
fundamental ‘irrationality’ of the psychiatric patient is seen as reason in itself to 
discard any knowledge claims from them about their mental health and their 
treatment by the psychiatric system. The unseemly phrase ‘the lunatics have 
taken over the asylum’ makes clear this view on mad people actually being 
listened to.  
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(Aside)The phrase itself is of uncertain origin but is thought to be grounded in an 
1845 Edgar Allen Poe short story called ”The System of  Dr Tarr and Professor 
Fether”, where a new form of treatment is introduced known as the “system of 
soothing” in which patients are treated gently, their beliefs taken seriously and 
they are granted liberty as opposed to the norm of the time of punishment, 
accusations of lunacy and incarceration. A visitor who comes to the hospital is 
shocked and disappointed to find that the “system of soothing” has been 
abandoned on favour of a traditional, disciplinarian approach. Over the course of 
an increasingly bizarre dinner with a majority women staff, it becomes clear that 
the system of soothing has enabled the majority female patient body to take on 
the role of staff and to lock up the male staff as the newly anointed lunatics. One 
memorable phrase which makes clear the complexity of dividing lines between 
madness and sanity and the perverse logic of the psychiatric system is – 
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 “If he (the lunatic) has a project in view, he conceals his design with a 
marvellous wisdom; and the dexterity with which he counterfeits sanity, 
presents, to the metaphysician, one of the most singular problems in the study of 
mind. When a madman appears thoroughly sane, indeed, it is high time to put 
him in a straitjacket.” The title of the story reveals to us what grizzly fate awaited 
the incarcerated staff at the hands of the recently liberated and vengeful 
patients- tarring and feathering. So while the story of origin for this phrase 
reveals an ironic and macabre morality play that teases with how difficult it is to 
tell apart the sane from the mad in appearance and action even back then, what 
we are left with is a seedy reductionism that renders mad knowledge dangerous.  
What we see now in mental health services is in stark contrast to this, at least at 
the level of rhetoric. Policy abounds with regards to the value that ‘experience’ 
brings to the field of mental health. A few brief examples can illustrate a larger 
trend: 
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My own professional body the British Psychological Society has an Expert by 
Experience strategy 2018-2019 which describes EbyEs as; “service users, carers 
and members of the general public with direct or indirect experience of working 
with clinical psychologists, in a non-professional capacity.” So in this case there 
is an emphasis not on the experiences that might bring us into contact with a 
psychologist in the first place but rather the experience of spending time with a 
psychologist in itself.  
 
The NHS Care Quality Commission describes Experts by Experience similarly as 
“are people who have personal experience of using or caring for someone who 
uses health, mental health and/or social care services that we regulate.”  
 
Interestingly the Royal College of Psychiatry seem to have a more traditional, 
patient and carer involvement approach which does not grant any form of 
expertise to experience explicitly. This may reveal a more consumerist approach 
to involving service users which positions their views as important by virtue of 
their service use. Whether this reveals an ideological objection to the idea of mad 
peoples having expertise or their experience being important is a worthwhile 
question but one that would require a specific discourse analysis.  
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Closer to home the Mental Health Commission- A Vision of Recovery Model in 
Irish Mental Health Services states that “People who have recovered or are 
recovering from mental illness are very vital sources of knowledge about the 
recovery process. This is well recognised by organisations such as GROW and 
also Schizophrenia Ireland where people may describe themselves as gaining 
valuable knowledge about schizophrenia through “self-experience”. (p13, italics 
added). This definition differs from the first two and is more like definitions from 
service users movements in that it sees expertise as not only being about service 
use but the importance of knowledge about mental health that develops from 
having an experience of a condition. So in my case according to this approach I 
have some claim to expertise by virtue of having ‘experienced’ a psychotic 
breakdown. So while in my capacity as an ‘expert by experience’ I may not take 
over the asylum, I may at least be asked to assist in certain aspects of its 
administration.  
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Now as I said at the beginning much strong scholarly work has been done on 
how this identity of ‘person with lived experience’ offers opportunities to 
previously marginalised groups to change how mental health services are 
orgnaised. Jijian Veronka’s paper ‘On the dangers of strategic essentialism’ offers 
a detailed and historically situated account of how this identity came to be in 
mental health, what it offers in way of opportunities but also importantly what 
risks it carries in reducing down the rich diversity of experience in mental health 
to an homogenous whole. Jijian cites at length a seminal paper in the area of 
experiential knowledge from a feminist historian perspective; Joan Scott’s 1991 
paper “The Evidence of Experience”. In the paper, Scott emphasises the 
importance of ‘visibility’ in relation to the experiences of underground groups. 
She goes on to critique an ahistorical treatment of ‘experience’ as by necessity 
being framed within dominant discursive formations. A central passage that is 
troubling;  
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 “It is not individuals who have experience, but subjects who are constituted 
through experience. Experience in this definition becomes not the origin of our 
explanation, not the authoritative evidence that grounds what is seen or known, 
but rather that which we seek to explain, that about which knowledge is 
produced. To think about experience in this way is to historicize it as well as to 
historicize the identities it produces.” (p780).  
But Scott’s is only one, relatively recent take on ‘experience’ as an object or 
subject of enquiry. She is not the first to be tempted to do away with it as being 
too vague and broad, nor is she the first to want to critically examine its claim to 
represent a form of knowledge that can be trusted. And yet it seems to me that 
the underpinning philosophy driving Scott’s paper- that of post-structuralism, or 
post-modernism, is one dominant way in which Mad Studies and academic work 
around ‘experiential knowledge’ understand what ‘experience’ means. And while 
Scott’s work adds much to the field in questioning the essential truth claims that 
‘experiential knowledge’ carries as a form of evidence in mental health, it would 
be limiting to solely focus on this particular understanding of what experience is 
and what it could be in mental health. Moreover, Scott’s post-structuralist 
mistrust of experience being meaningful outside of discourse and historical 
context may have important implications for those of us using our experiences of 
mental health but take a different approach to understanding experience.  
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For the next section of my talk, I have drawn extensively on the work of the 
Intellectual Historian Martin Jay, in particular his 2005 book on the modern 
history of ‘experience’- “Songs of Experience- Modern American and European 
variations on a universal theme”. In this book Jay charts the competing ways that 
‘experience’ has been conceptualised from political, scientific, artistic, religious 
and philosophical perspectives. In this ‘history of an idea’ Jay discusses various 
attempts to reform or even to do away with the concept of experience altogether, 
the example of Joan Wallace Scott being one we have touched on. More than 
anything what becomes clear when we delve into the area of ‘experience’ as an 
idea is that there is no one formation of experience that can properly capture it’s 
different uses across time and place. So we are not exploring ‘experience’ here in 
order to understand what it is, so much as thinking about it’s different meanings 
in order to examine their usefulness in the development of experiential 
knowledge forms in the field of mental health.  
What I want to consider with you today is a number of questions related to this: 
How is the history of experience as an idea relevant to those of us using our own 
experiences of mental health? How do we limit the range of ways we understand 
our experience by framing it in a particular way or for a particular purpose? 
What are some of the risks to us in using our experience to inform the field of 
mental health? How can we protect our ‘experience’ and the experience of others 
in doing this complex work? 
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Experience and science- “experience itself is a scientific scandal ... the ordinary 
everyday human world ... is consigned by science to its slop bucket.” Laing, Voice 
of Experience (1982) 
What RD Laing was voicing here, in his own inimitable style, is a longstanding 
and complex suspicion of experience as being an inferior form of knowledge than 
that gained through empirical investigation.   
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As the literary critic Terry Eagleton writes – We live in “the era of scientific 
rationalism, which is interested in weighing and measuring an object rather than 
registering its sinuous curve or peculiar tint. Science is the enemy of the 
sensuous. It is anchored in perception, but it also puts it into question. It looks as 
though the sun is coming up, but actually the earth is going down. A rift opens up 
between how things are and how we experience them. Since this is a rift inherent 
in reality itself, our experience of the world is bound to be a matter of 
misrecognition as well as knowledge.”  
I have highlighted the word misrecognition as we will return to it again later in 
our talk when we consider experience in the light of our current moment of 
identity politics.  
In health research some researchers have welcomed the inclusion of experiential 
knowledge as a resource but only because it is ‘wrong knowledge.’ So in this case 
you ask non-experts for information about a health condition in order to find out 
how lay people wrongly understand particular health problems.  
This inherent suspicion of knowledge derived from experience has a long 
history, dating back to Francis Bacon, described by Hegel as the father of 
empiricism and who sought to develop reliable ways of measuring phenomena 
that has been called the ‘quest for certainty’. 
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Bacon said “Experience is blind and silly, so that while men roam and wander 
around without any definitive course, merely taking counsel of things as happen 
to come before them, they range widely, yet move little forward.” Reading this in 
Ireland I can’t help but notice the reference to aimless wandering and two of the 
most important walks in all of literature, those of Steven Deadalus and Leopold 
Bloom in James Joyce’s Ulysses. The initial spark of inspiration for which came 
from, of course, Joyce himself walking apparently aimlessly around Dublin. Now 
it seems to me that it is foolish to compare the wealth of knowledge about the 
human condition that can be learnt from a great work of art such as Ulysses and 
that which comes from systematic empirical scientific research. They are quite 
simply, different forms of knowledge.  
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The author and literary critic David Lodge talks about the potential 
complementary use of art and science by using examples from neuroscience and 
the idea of qualia. Qualia refers to individual subjective experience and Lodge 
points out that it highlights the limitations of science. While we can map which 
areas of the brain light up when a person eats an apple, we cannot capture 
scientifically the experience of eating an apple. Lodge proposes literature as a 
way to fill this empirical gap and uses the example of poetry as the purest, 
distilled form of qualia. I would suggest that experiential knowledge can be 
another way to do what empirical science alone cannot- to capture the qualia of 
living with mental health problems in all their multiplicity. In my own modest 
work I contributed an experience of living with trauma that tried to express 
something of what it was to be ‘in it’. This required a departure from purely 
psychological models of explanation and led to me citing varying figures from the 
musician John Coltrane to the plays of Samuel Beckett to the Irish novelist 
Eimear McBride to try to get across what trauma is ‘like’.  It’s flavor, texture, 
appearance and sound.  
But we must not think of this work as directly comparable to empirical research 
and so downgrade it as a lesser form of knowledge as will inevitably happen if 
exposed to the same quality standards. It is simply different and necessary to 
reach the corners of madness that science cannot. Once we do this and do not 
make claims based on experiential knowledge that are similar to those from 
empirical research, then a lot of the historical tension between these two areas 
can disappear. It seems that in order for this to possible though, experiential 
knowledge must not be reduced down to a purely epistemological level- as in 
how reliable and valid is this knowledge form. This is as much an ethical demand 
as a scientific one because it concerns the status of experiential knowledge as 
legitimate and therefore the standing of those with it as recognised epistemic 
subjects to use Miranda Fricker’s phrase.  So we can now turn to the ethical 
responsibilities of those of us who listen to and use the experiential knowledge 
of others in our work.   
Responsible listeners- In her work on epistemic justice Fricker extends the scope 
to include the responsibilities of those witnessing experiential knowledge. 
Fricker calls for ethics to rescue epistemology from a moral relativism that 
cannot distinguish between good knowledge and bad. The seedy, bottom line 
argument that many of my colleagues in psychology espouse which claims that 
scientific knowledge is ethically neutral. We can see why psychology might like 
to claim moral neutrality from a cursory reading of its history, in particular 
Lynne Friedli’s work on the use of psychology in welfare reform. Scientific 
objectivity in this case is a cover for psychological ideas being used to frighten 
many of our most marginalized, including many of my brothers and sisters from 
the survivor movement.  
In evaluating the quality of experiential knowledge, Fricker warns against a 
reductionist binary choice between uncritical acceptance and intellectualist 
argumentation. Instead she calls for a ‘critical openness’ that is refined by the 
sensibility that can be offered by ethics. 
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 This approach can promote certain ethical virtues including a testimonial 
sensibility which Fricker describes as “A testimonial sensibility, then, needs to be 
shaped by collective and individual experiences of testimonial encounters 
described in rich, socially specific terms relating to the trustworthiness of 
speakers of different social types in different sorts of contexts.” She claims that 
the development of this sensibility can lead to an ‘epistemic revolution’ whereby 
our previously held beliefs about the trustworthiness of certain groups can be 
transformed. It is not difficult for us to conclude that an epistemic revolution 
rooted in an ethical sensibility is needed in mental health and that we as 
professional listeners have some way to go to achieve it. This critical openness 
does not require us to conclude that all experiential knowledge is true but 
instead that even if untrue, it is still important. I notice myself in my role as 
service user and carer involvement lead in my university (a job that is much 
more interesting than the title makes it sound), at times being ready to pass over 
experiential knowledge that does not fit with the university’s agenda. Another 
thing I notice in my work in this area is that at times there is too much pain to 
bear in people’s experience and so listeners turn away feeling overwhelmed and 
helpless. I think this is particularly true of trauma. If we think about the context 
of my abuse, it was the Christian Brothers who destroyed generations of young 
Irish men systematically through physical and sexual violence, and bullying. This 
all happened in plain sight. Our entire society turned a blind eye for decades. So 
part of the development of a testimonial sensibility has to be learning to bear 
difficult and distressing experiences in other people.  
Being critically reflective to these tendencies to turn away or disregard is an 
ethical task that requires vigilance. One way for me to create space for this 
vigilance is to come here and talk about it with you. Therefore this talk in itself 
can be seen as part of a process of me trying to develop a testimonial sensibility 
towards experiential knowledge. My point being that this is hard work and 
unlikely to come naturally to us. It requires commitment.  
Now we have considered the ethical responsibilities of the listeners to 
experiential knowledge, we can return again finally to the purveyors of 
experiential knowledge.  In this last section I want to consider with you what the 
risks are for those of us who use our experiential knowledge in the field of 
mental health, before concluding on how we might best navigate them 
individually and collectively.  
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Experience in an age of commodification risks jeopardizing an idealized version 
of our experiential knowledge through cheapening it to sell in the marketplace. 
As the German philosopher Theodor Adorno said in the 1990’s, “The marrow of 
experience has been sucked out: there is none, not even that apparently set at 
remove from commerce, that has not been gnawed away.” (1997, p31). In mental 
health we can see this in the work of Lucy Costa, Jijian Veronka and colleagues 
who has written about challenging the appropriation of psychiatric survivors 
experiential knowledge in the form of narratives. They talk about the risks of 
‘disability tourism’ and ‘patient porn’ whereby the experiences of people can be 
coopted and used to progress the interests of mental health services. In the 
context of this paper we can think of this as the theft of experience. The use of 
experiential knowledge as a commodity, which can be traded in a marketplace, 
and discarded when no longer needed. And while I agree with Lucy and Jijian in 
this analysis, I think it could go further. I think that in an age of identity politics 
we can commodify our own experience in a way that can paradoxically lead to us 
being alienated from it in the way Adorno alluded to.   
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To turn back to Terry Eagleton again, “Instead of wandering along Hadrian’s 
Wall, we have the Hadrian’s Wall Experience; instead of the Giant’s Causeway, 
the Giant’s Causeway Experience.…Since what all of these packaged tourist spots 
have in common is the fact that they are experienced, they become, like 
commodities, interchangeable. Experience, a term which can mean an event of 
exceptional value, ends up as a dead leveller.” 
 
 In using experiential knowledge in mental health we can find ourselves 
inadvertently using some of our most painful memories as commodities. I think 
that a hardline identity politics pushes us towards what Martin Jay refers to as an 
‘overly claimed experience’. In other words experience that is too closely 
managed and presented. Experience that is used to say too clearly who we are 
and what we are not. Experience that binds us and limits us. The risks of 
misrecognition that we bookmarked earlier are heightened when we frame our 
experience and our identity in the same way. The costs for us having our 
experiential knowledge critiqued is much higher than when we place so much 
value in it as part of who we are. I have been on the painful end of this myself, 
having ‘debates’ about aetiology in mental health which I am not able to 
approach as sport. As soon as someone questions the role of trauma in the 
development of mental health I cease to be a scientist. My survivor identity kicks 
in. I think this is where a lot of the pain in this experiential knowledge work can 
come from. When our experiential knowledge is not treated with sufficient 
respect then we feel it is an attack on our identity and draw battle lines 
accordingly. This can easily slip into a pattern of seeing our experiential 
knowledge as a source of group identity that clearly demarcates who we are in 
comparison to others and can lead to the sorts of splits that have bedevilled 
survivor movements for years. It also has the effect of limiting our exposure to 
different experiences, we can become stuck in the role of service user, survivor 
or expert by experience when that identity is no longer serving us. The risk for 
me is that in using my experiences of abuse to help inform the field of mental 
health, I become imprisoned by them once again.  
 
So what is there to be done? 
 
I think, for me at any rate, there is wisdom to be found in ideas and the idea of 
experience has been pored over for centuries in ways that I hope my talk has 
hinted at are not really that different from today in our relatively modest world 
of mental health.  
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To return to Martin Jay one more time, “the very notion of experience as a 
commodity for sale is precisely the opposite of what many…have argued an 
experience should be….something which can never be fully possessed by its owner. 
Instead because experiences involve encounters with otherness and open onto a 
future that is not fully contained in the past or the present, they defy the very 
attempt to reduce them to moments of fulfilled intensity in the marketplace of 
sensations.” Jay (2005, p 405, italics added). Now one thing I think Jay is getting 
at here is that we can never really own our experiences and so experiential 
knowledge must be in constant movement, dynamic flux or else it ceases to be 
truly experiential at all. So in looking to a future not yet experienced, I try to 
ensure my experience of past traumas can be faithfully rendered in the present 
but not so much that they keep me stuck here.  
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As a final note I wanted to end on perhaps the greatest chronicler of experience, 
the poet and artist William Blake. In his poem Eternity he succinctly captures 
what I cannot about how to treat our own and others experiential knowledge: 
 
“He who binds to himself a joy 
Does the winged life destroy 
He who kisses the joy as it flies 
Lives in eternities sunrise” 
 
 
 
